

Online Appendix

Teargas and Selfie Cams: Foreign Protests and Media in the Digital Age

A Study 1 Manipulation and Attention Checks

This study involved showing respondents several different edited videos in order to gauge the effects of different types of footage on their preferences for a U.S. foreign policy response. In addition to asking whether respondents supported sanctions against the country shown in the clip, we also asked respondents if they would engage in political behavior to support the protesters. Respondents were asked whether they would be willing to do any of the following in support of protesters after watching each video: sign a petition, donate money, call or write a letter to their Congressional representative, participate in a protest outside of the U.S. Congress building, organize a protest outside of the U.S. Congress building, or take up a full-time leadership role in a national campaign.

A.1 Manipulation Check via Pre-Test




Figure 1: Study 1, manipulation check. Difference-in-means of perceived levels of police violence in videos across and within experimental groups.

To examine the impact of repression on public opinion across contexts when protesters had different ethnic identities, we manipulated the response of the police (violent v. nonviolent) and the location of the protests depicted (Hong Kong v. Ukraine v. Egypt). Using video clips allowed us to convey protesters’ ethnicity in a more subtle and natural way so that respondents were not aware of the specific experimental manipulation. We edited these videos to make them as similar to each other as possible, and conducted a pre-test of the videos prior to implementing the study to ensure their comparability on a few important dimensions. The pre-test was taken by 98 participants on MTurk in April 2016.

In particular, we checked to see whether the videos were perceived as comparable on the intensity of police violence (for different locations) and whether the violent and nonviolent conditions were significantly different enough. Figure 1 presents results of the police violence manipulation check with 95% confidence intervals. The pre-test also asked questions about emotions that the videos evoked in respondents (fear, anxiety, etc.) using a measure of film clip emotional assessment from Coan and Allen (2007). Finally, in the pre-test, respondents were instructed to describe what they had seen, which allowed us to check to see if viewers were noticing anything about the different videos that we did not intend to convey. These checks confirmed that our videos were operating in the ways that we intended.

A.2 Attention Check

To ensure that survey participants were paying attention to the survey — and to the videos that they were assigned — the survey design included two features intended to monitor and encourage attention. First, upon reaching the video page, the button required to advance to the next page of the survey did not appear until 35 seconds — the length of the video — had passed. As such, survey participants wishing to move ahead early could not. Second, respondents were asked about what kind of protest was featured in the video after watching it. 97% correctly answered this attention check question by indicating they had watched a pro-democracy protest.

B Study 1 Covariates Table

Variable	Description
age	<i>Age of respondent (numeric).</i>
male	<i>Dummy variable indicating gender.</i>
white	<i>Dummy variable indicating race.</i>
voted in 2016 election	<i>Dummy variable indicating whether respondent voted in the 2016 election.</i>
republican	<i>Dummy variable for those who selected “Republican” or “Independent” and “Leaning Republican” on the survey Party ID question.</i>
college degree	<i>Dummy variable for college graduates.</i>
income above \$60K	<i>Dummy variable for respondents with a household income of \$60K or more.</i>
protester	<i>Dummy variable indicating if respondent has ever participated in a political protest.</i>
attention to int’l news	<i>Categorical variable for news consumption.</i>
thermometer	<i>Warmth towards the world region viewed in the clip. (Respondents were not informed of which region their clip displayed; they rated their feelings toward all regions from 0 to 100.)</i>

Table 1: Descriptions of Control Variables from Study 1

C Study 1 Evidence of Random Assignment

In Tables 2 and 3, we present baseline means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of background covariates for respondents assigned to our different treatment conditions, as evidence of balance (suggesting our random assignment to treatment conditions worked as expected). The thermometer variable is not included in the second table because the covariate included in the regression is based on treatment assignment (i.e. feelings about the region where the protest took place).

Variable	Violent	Nonviolent
age	36.40 (12.58)	37.40 (13.23)
male	0.47 (0.50)	0.48 (0.50)
white	0.80 (0.40)	0.77 (0.42)
voted in 2016 election	0.71 (0.45)	0.69 (0.46)
republican	0.34 (0.47)	0.38 (0.49)
college degree	0.53 (0.50)	0.52 (0.50)
income above \$60K	0.37 (0.48)	0.35 (0.48)
protester	0.25 (0.43)	0.22 (0.41)
attention to int'l news	2.81 (1.09)	2.92 (1.03)
thermometer	56.53 (27.41)	57.71 (25.03)

Table 2: Covariate means and standard deviations by treatment condition - violence

Variable	Hong Kong	Ukraine	Egypt
age	37.39 (13.34)	35.69 (12.77)	37.73 (12.63)
male	0.49 (0.50)	0.46 (0.50)	0.49 (0.50)
white	0.80 (0.40)	0.78 (0.42)	0.79 (0.41)
voted in 2016 election	0.69 (0.46)	0.71 (0.45)	0.70 (0.46)
republican	0.36 (0.48)	0.33 (0.47)	0.39 (0.49)
college degree	0.51 (0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.56 (0.50)
income above \$60K	0.35 (0.48)	0.34 (0.48)	0.38 (0.49)
protester	0.23 (0.42)	0.25 (0.43)	0.22 (0.41)
attention to int'l news	2.86 (1.06)	2.85 (1.04)	2.89 (1.08)

Table 3: Covariate means and standard deviations by treatment condition - location

D Study 1 Robustness Check

At the end of our survey, respondents were asked to guess the country and region depicted in the protest footage. $\approx 27\%$ of respondents recognized the location of the protests as Hong Kong,¹ Ukraine or Egypt.² To address arguments that knowing where the protests took place might affect preferences for imposing sanctions or learning more, we show results replicated for the subset of respondents who did not recognize the location of the protests ($N = 738$). As can be seen from Figure 2, the results reported in the article remain largely the same.

E Study 1 Survey Design

Full videos can be accessed here: 1) [Ukraine violent](#) 2) [Ukraine peaceful](#) 3) [Egypt violent](#) 4) [Egypt peaceful](#) 5) [Hong Kong violent](#) 6) [Hong Kong peaceful](#).

¹We included the response “China” as a correct answer so as to be as inclusive as possible in our analysis. The government of the People’s Republic of China considers Hong Kong to be a Special Administrative Region within China, and bodies such as the United Nations do not consider Hong Kong to be an independent country. Thus, a respondent might plausibly know that the protest was taking place in Hong Kong and still reply “China” when asked which country the protest took place in.

²It is worth noting that respondents who provided the correct keywords in their responses were not necessarily sure of the actual location for these protests: many respondents used expressions such as “maybe” and “I guess” to note their lack of confidence in their answers.




Figure 2: Study 1, robustness check for Figure 1 in the paper. Effect of violent repression treatment on support for targeted sanctions and political behavior for respondents that did not recognize the location of the protests. 90% and 95% confidence intervals. In the robustness check, the effect of the violence condition on support for sanctions is significant at $\alpha = 0.1$ instead of $\alpha = 0.05$.

E.1 Study 1 Additional Information about the Structural Topic Model

A Structural Topic Model (STM) is an unsupervised topic model,³ which builds on the Latent Dirichlet Allocation model (LDA) (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003; Blei, 2012), but allows for the inclusion of covariates of interest. Prior to analysis, we used standard text preprocessing conventions, such as removal of punctuation, numbers, and stopwords, as well as stemming. We chose to run a model with three topics after estimating the model varying number of topics from 3 to 10 and determining a substantive interpretation of the results of each specification. Three to ten topics are recommended as a useful starting range for survey experiments (Roberts et al., 2014). We use the simplified frequency-exclusivity scoring (FREX), which summarizes words with the harmonic mean of the probability of appearance under a topic and the exclusivity to that topic, providing the most semantically intuitive representation of topics (Roberts et al., 2014). As a validation step, in addition to looking at the FREX words, we also examined exemplar documents for each topic: responses with the highest proportion of words drawn from the topic.

F Study 1 Regression Table

Table 4 shows results for our regressions in Study 1. Outcomes for sanctions support (Models 1-3) and political behavior (Models 7-9) are coded as binary variables, while outcomes for donations (Models 4-6) are coded depending on amount. Note that, as shown in Models 2, 5, and 8, including an indicator variable for the location treatment does not change the results. When respondents' demographic characteristics are included as covariates, the coefficient on violence for sanctions support is comparable in magnitude and goes in the same direction, but is no longer significant at statistically conventional levels (violence has an approx. 5% effect, $p = 0.136$). This indicates that some respondent characteristics, for example partisanship, affect the perception of violent repression in the videos. However, it should also be noted that violence *remains significant* when a 7-point ordinal measure of support for sanctions is used in Models 1 through 3.

Table 4: Study 1: Effects of Violent Police Response

	Dependent variable:								
	(1)	support sanctions		(4)	donation		(7)	political behavior	
violence	0.065** (0.031)	0.063** (0.031)	0.046 (0.031)	-0.993 (5.207)	-1.118 (5.214)	-2.629 (5.315)	0.032 (0.031)	0.034 (0.031)	0.010 (0.030)
factor(region = Ukraine)		-0.016 (0.038)	-0.030 (0.038)		2.531 (6.437)	1.553 (6.553)		0.007 (0.038)	-0.019 (0.037)
factor(region = Egypt)		0.031 (0.038)	0.062 (0.041)		8.105 (6.428)	10.011 (6.981)		-0.049 (0.038)	0.024 (0.040)
age			-0.001 (0.001)			-0.339 (0.215)			-0.005*** (0.001)
male			0.013 (0.032)			8.840 (5.413)			-0.044 (0.031)
white			0.030 (0.039)			-14.285** (6.672)			-0.021 (0.038)
voted in 2016 election			0.007 (0.036)			9.238 (6.180)			0.050 (0.035)
republican			-0.111*** (0.033)			-8.374 (5.745)			-0.094*** (0.033)
college degree			0.028 (0.032)			-1.791 (5.534)			-0.037 (0.031)
income above \$60K			-0.025 (0.033)			2.917 (5.687)			-0.015 (0.032)
protester			0.142*** (0.039)			4.884 (6.649)			0.215*** (0.038)
attention to int'l news			-0.026* (0.016)			-7.139*** (2.671)			-0.029* (0.015)
thermometer			0.001 (0.001)			0.052 (0.114)			0.003*** (0.001)
Constant	0.379*** (0.021)	0.375*** (0.032)	0.393*** (0.101)	13.651*** (3.590)	10.048* (5.309)	43.086** (17.369)	0.570*** (0.021)	0.583*** (0.032)	0.728*** (0.098)
Observations	1,008	1,008	987	1,010	1,010	987	1,010	1,010	987
R ²	0.004	0.006	0.052	0.00004	0.002	0.029	0.001	0.004	0.106
Adjusted R ²	0.003	0.003	0.040	-0.001	-0.001	0.016	0.0001	0.001	0.094
Residual Std. Error	0.491 (df = 1006)	0.491 (df = 1004)	0.482 (df = 973)	82.637 (df = 1008)	82.650 (df = 1006)	82.855 (df = 973)	0.493 (df = 1008)	0.493 (df = 1006)	0.469 (df = 973)
F Statistic	4.398** (df = 1; 1006)	2.011 (df = 3; 1004)	4.140** (df = 13; 973)	0.036 (df = 1; 1008)	0.575 (df = 3; 1006)	2.243** (df = 13; 973)	1.080 (df = 1; 1008)	1.220 (df = 3; 1006)	8.890*** (df = 13; 973)

Note:

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

³In these models, topics are inferred by the model instead of being pre-defined by the researcher.

G Study 2 Covariates Table

Variable	Description
age	<i>Age of respondent (numeric).</i>
male	<i>Dummy variable indicating gender.</i>
white	<i>Dummy variable indicating race.</i>
voted in 2016 election	<i>Dummy variable indicating whether respondent voted in the 2016 election.</i>
republican	<i>Dummy variable for those who selected “Republican” or “Independent” and “Leaning Republican” on the survey Party ID question.</i>
college degree	<i>Dummy variable for college graduates.</i>
income above \$60K	<i>Dummy variable for respondents with a household income of \$60K or more.</i>
attention to int’l news	<i>Categorical variable for news consumption.</i>
affinity towards Latin America	<i>Same as “thermometer” in Study 1. Warmth towards the world region viewed in the clip. (Respondents were not informed of which region their clip displayed and rated feelings toward all regions from 0 to 100.)</i>
confidence in U.S. police	<i>Confidence in the police (0 to 100).</i>
confidence in U.S. government	<i>Confidence in the government (0 to 100).</i>
confidence in U.S. media	<i>Confidence in the media (0 to 100).</i>

Table 5: Descriptions of Control Variables from Study 2

H Study 2 Evidence of Random Assignment

In Tables 6 and 7, we present baseline means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of background covariates for respondents assigned to our different treatment conditions, as evidence of balance (suggesting our random assignment to treatment conditions worked as expected).

I Study 2 Additional Analyses

I.1 Blame Affected by Violence, Not by Mobile Footage

Hypothesis (blame): Respondents in the cell phone footage condition will be more likely to blame the government and/or the security forces, not the protesters, for the escalation of the situation.

In Study 2, we evaluated the additional hypothesis above but did not report findings in the paper. After watching the video, respondents were asked to assign proportions of blame to the protesters, police, and government for “any escalation of violence” in the protests. The question was worded this way because some respondents watched videos featuring an escalation of violence, while others did not. Respondents were presented with a sliding-scale blame meter, and the survey design prevented them from moving on to the next question until 100% of blame was assigned.

In this hypothesis, we predicted that the mobile footage treatment would increase blame towards the police and government. Instead, our results, displayed in Figure 3, show that watching mobile footage appears to decrease blame

Variable	Violent	Nonviolent
age	38.05 (12.72)	38.07 (12.48)
male	0.47 (0.50)	0.47 (0.50)
white	0.76 (0.43)	0.74 (0.44)
voted in 2016 election	0.74 (0.44)	0.75 (0.43)
republican	0.36 (0.48)	0.37 (0.48)
college degree	0.58 (0.49)	0.57 (0.50)
income above \$60K	0.45 (0.50)	0.43 (0.50)
attention to int'l news	2.16 (1.05)	2.18 (1.00)
affinity towards Latin America	65.55 (22.02)	65.83 (22.06)
confidence in U.S. police	59.72 (27.80)	59.26 (26.21)
confidence in U.S. government	45.95 (25.98)	46.60 (25.52)
confidence in U.S. media	46.88 (27.76)	47.66 (26.48)

Table 6: Covariate means and standard deviations by treatment condition - violence

Variable	Mobile	TV
age	37.59 (12.31)	38.54 (12.87)
male	0.50 (0.50)	0.44 (0.50)
white	0.76 (0.43)	0.73 (0.44)
voted in 2016 election	0.76 (0.43)	0.74 (0.44)
republican	0.34 (0.48)	0.39 (0.49)
college degree	0.57 (0.49)	0.57 (0.50)
income above \$60K	0.45 (0.50)	0.43 (0.50)
attention to int'l news	2.17 (1.00)	2.17 (1.04)
affinity towards Latin America	66.01 (21.65)	65.35 (22.44)
confidence in U.S. police	58.72 (26.94)	60.28 (27.09)
confidence in U.S. government	45.70 (25.02)	46.86 (26.47)
confidence in U.S. media	47.42 (26.98)	47.10 (27.29)

Table 7: Covariate means and standard deviations by treatment condition - media

towards all three actors: protesters, police, and the government. It does appear to be the case that blame shifts away from protesters more than it shifts away from police and the government: blame towards protesters decreases the most (-0.5%), followed by blame towards police (-0.3%) then blame towards the government (-0.2%). However, none of these results are statistically significant.

Though not pre-registered, our findings on the effects of violence upon blame were interesting, consistent with our other findings about violence, and thus, worth reporting. Witnessing violent repression had a negative, statistically significant effect upon blame assigned to protesters. On average, respondents in the violent condition assigned approximately 2.5 fewer percentage points of blame to protesters than respondents in the non-violent condition. The effects of violence on blaming the police and the government were positive, but not statistically significant. These results are reflected in Figure 4.

I.2 Trustworthiness of Video Source

Hypothesis (trust): We expect both the repression and the source of the footage to influence the levels of respondents' trust in the content of the video but we do not have any prior beliefs about the direction of the effects.

In Study 2, we also evaluated the above hypothesis about trust – though in hindsight, this hypothesis might be better described as a research question due to our agnostic expectations. During the survey, respondents were asked to what degree they trusted the footage in the video clip watched “to give an accurate account of events on the ground.” While we expected the video source and level of police violence to have an effect upon the trustworthiness of the videos included in the survey, we did not have clear priors about which direction the effects would move. We evaluated effects on trustworthiness using an OLS regression with an interaction term included between mobile and violent treatments. Many of the results on trustworthiness fell short of statistical significance. The marginal effect of the mobile condition is




Figure 3: Study 2, effects of mobile treatment on blame. Plot shows OLS results without control covariates, ordinal blame outcome. 90% and 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 4: Study 2, effects of violence treatment on blame. Plot shows OLS results without control covariates, ordinal blame outcome. 90% and 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 5: Study 2, effects on trustworthiness of video. Plot shows OLS results without control covariates, binary trustworthiness outcome. 90% and 95% confidence intervals.

negative, but the result is not statistically significant.⁴ These results are reflected in Figure 5.

We did not make (or pre-register) further predictions about factors that would affect the trustworthiness of videos. Nevertheless, follow-up tests help to explain our earlier findings. For example, an OLS regression using a binary trustworthiness outcome on the mobile and TV news groups separately shows statistically significant correlations between several demographic and attitudinal variables and respondents’ perceptions of trustworthiness. For the mobile footage, being a Republican ($\beta = -0.059, \alpha = 0.10$), having a college degree ($\beta = -0.048, \alpha = 0.10$), and higher confidence in the police in the United States ($\beta = -0.001, \alpha = 0.10$) were correlated with decreased trust in the videos. Meanwhile, higher confidence in the media sector in the United States ($\beta = 0.002, \alpha = 0.01$) was correlated with increased trust in the videos. For the news footage, beyond the significant effect of violence mentioned earlier, only higher confidence in the media in the United States ($\beta = 0.002, \alpha = 0.01$) was correlated with trust in the videos, and the correlation was positive.⁵

J Study 2 Manipulation and Attention Checks

J.1 Manipulation Check

To ensure that survey participants had taken note of our manipulations, respondents were asked about what kind of footage they had watched later in the survey. This question came near the end of the survey, after respondents had answered the outcome questions. 90% of respondents correctly indicated that they had watched TV news /mobile camera footage, depending on their assigned video.

⁴When demographic controls are added to the OLS regression, the conditional violence effect in this regression is statistically significant, albeit at the $\alpha = 0.1$ level. This means that, on average, the *violence* \times *tv news* condition was considered to be about 4.5% more trustworthy than the *no violence* \times *tv news* condition.

⁵In this case, results differ depending on whether a binary or an ordinal trustworthiness outcome is used. When using an ordinal trustworthiness outcome instead of a binary one, attention to international news and affinity towards Latin America both have a positive, statistically significant impact on trustworthiness for mobile videos. Attention to international news and affinity towards Latin America – in addition to violence – have a positive, statistically significant impact on trustworthiness while age has a significant and negative effect on trustworthiness for TV news videos. The logic for these differing results is as follows: An individual’s feelings about the region pictured, their attention to international news, and in the case of traditional television news media, their age, are the factors that impact the trustworthiness of videos on a step-by-step basis along a 0 to 5 rating scale. However, when it comes to making the larger step between calling a mobile phone video either “untrustworthy” or “trustworthy” (binary outcome), partisanship, higher education, and feelings about U.S. police all come into play. When it comes to determining whether a television news media clip is “untrustworthy” or “trustworthy,” the violence depicted in the clip and one’s confidence in the U.S. media sector are the factors that matter.

J.2 Attention Checks

To ensure that survey participants were paying attention to the survey — and to the videos that they were assigned — the survey design included two features intended to monitor and encourage attention. First, upon reaching the video page, the button required to advance to the next page of the survey did not appear until 35 seconds — the length of the video — had passed. As such, survey participants wishing to move ahead early could not. Second, respondents were asked about what kind of protest was featured in the video after watching it. 95% correctly answered this attention check question by indicating that the protesters wanted greater democratic governance.

K Study 2 Robustness Checks

At the end of our survey, respondents were asked to guess the country and region depicted in the protest footage. Through this question, we tested the effectiveness of our attempts to obscure the location of the protests. A number of responses referred directly to our modifications to the videos, indicating they had had the desired effect. For example, one respondent wrote, “I don’t know. Without being able to read any of the signs, I have no idea.” Another said, “I have no idea. I looked for clues in any words appearing in the video, but the camera did not ever get a shot of the front of the signs the protesters were holding. There is enough unrest throughout the world that a protest of this nature could turn up almost anywhere.” A third answered, “I’m not sure there was no sound to the video.”

Still, over half of the respondents indicated correctly that the protests took place in “Latin America” or “South America.” As a result, we have included affinity towards Latin America in all of our regressions with covariates. Moreover, $\approx 26\%$ of respondents recognized the location of the protests as Venezuela. To address arguments that knowing where the protests take place might affect preferences for imposing sanctions or learning more, all of our results can be found recalculated below using both the full dataset ($N = 1748$) and the subset of respondents that did not recognize the location of the protests ($N = 1293$). As can be seen from this appendix, the results reported in the article remain largely the same.




Figure 6: Study 2, robustness check for Figure 4 in the paper. Effect of violent repression treatment on support for targeted sanctions and interest in learning more about protests. 90% and 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 7: Study 2, robustness check for Figure 5 in the paper. Effects on support for targeted sanctions. 90% and 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 8: Study 2, robustness check for Figure 6 in the paper. Effects on interest in learning more about protests. 90% and 95% confidence intervals.

L Study 2 Survey Design

This article involved an experimental manipulation in which survey respondents were either presented with a video that featured TV news footage or mobile phone footage of protests happening overseas. The videos were edited so that a title screen showed before the footage played in each case. For the TV news condition, an animated news header with the title, “News Report, Protests Abroad” opened the clip. For the mobile phone condition, a black screen with a title opened the clip, saying, “Mobile Phone Footage of Protests Abroad.” Moreover, the footage following the title screen in the mobile phone condition was displayed in portrait orientation (as opposed to landscape) with black margins, as is common in mobile phone footage commonly shared online. Full videos can be accessed here: 1) [peaceful news footage](#) 2) [violent news footage](#) 3) [peaceful mobile footage](#) 4) [violent mobile footage](#).



Figure 9: Title screen for TV news condition



Figure 10: Title screen for mobile phone condition



Figure 11: Opening scene for mobile phone condition

In this survey, under the outcome question asking about preference for imposition of sanctions, respondents were provided with the following definition of targeted sanctions: “‘Targeted sanctions’ are sanctions applied only to a country’s leaders and political elites (i.e., powerful individuals that influence a country’s politics and governance). Examples include restrictions on travel of certain individuals to the United States, freezing the assets of certain individuals when they are held in U.S. banks, and preventing the sale of American-made weapons to leaders of the military or security forces in a foreign country.”

M Study 2 Regression Tables

Table 8: Regressions for sanctions support and interest in learning more about protests, with and without demographic and attitudinal controls. Outcomes are binary variables.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	support for sanctions		interest in learning more	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
mobile		0.007 (0.024)		0.007 (0.022)
violence	0.070*** (0.024)	0.072*** (0.024)	-0.012 (0.022)	-0.009 (0.022)
republican		-0.063** (0.029)		-0.035 (0.026)
voted in 2016 election		0.083*** (0.029)		0.039 (0.027)
college degree		0.062** (0.025)		0.024 (0.023)
attention to int'l news		0.044*** (0.012)		0.059*** (0.011)
male		0.045* (0.024)		0.006 (0.022)
age		0.0002 (0.001)		0.003*** (0.001)
white		0.053* (0.028)		-0.065** (0.026)
income above \$60K		0.009 (0.025)		-0.007 (0.023)
affinity towards Latin America		0.002*** (0.001)		0.002*** (0.001)
confidence in U.S. police		-0.0005 (0.001)		-0.0005 (0.001)
confidence in U.S. government		0.0003 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)
confidence in U.S. media		0.001 (0.001)		0.0005 (0.0005)
Constant	0.483*** (0.017)	0.074 (0.068)	0.304*** (0.016)	-0.057 (0.062)
Observations	1,748	1,711	1,748	1,711
R ²	0.005	0.056	0.0002	0.055
Adjusted R ²	0.004	0.048	-0.0004	0.048
Residual Std. Error	0.499 (df = 1746)	0.488 (df = 1696)	0.458 (df = 1746)	0.447 (df = 1696)
F Statistic	8.498*** (df = 1; 1746)	7.173*** (df = 14; 1696)	0.306 (df = 1; 1746)	7.092*** (df = 14; 1696)

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table 9: Regressions for sanctions support and interest in learning more about protests with an interaction term, with and without demographic and attitudinal controls. Outcomes are binary variables.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	support for sanctions		interest in learning more	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
mobile	0.032 (0.034)	0.022 (0.034)	0.028 (0.031)	0.033 (0.031)
violence	0.084** (0.034)	0.087*** (0.034)	0.010 (0.031)	0.017 (0.031)
mobile × violence	-0.026 (0.048)	-0.030 (0.047)	-0.042 (0.044)	-0.052 (0.043)
republican		-0.063** (0.029)		-0.035 (0.026)
voted in 2016 election		0.083*** (0.029)		0.039 (0.027)
college degree		0.063** (0.025)		0.025 (0.023)
attention to int'l news		0.044*** (0.012)		0.059*** (0.011)
male		0.045* (0.024)		0.006 (0.022)
age		0.0002 (0.001)		0.003*** (0.001)
white		0.053* (0.028)		-0.065** (0.026)
income above \$60K		0.009 (0.025)		-0.007 (0.023)
affinity towards Latin America		0.002*** (0.001)		0.002*** (0.001)
confidence in U.S. police		-0.0005 (0.001)		-0.0005 (0.001)
confidence in U.S. government		0.0003 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)
confidence in U.S. media		0.001 (0.001)		0.0003 (0.0005)
Constant	0.466*** (0.025)	0.066 (0.069)	0.289*** (0.023)	-0.071 (0.063)
Observations	1,748	1,711	1,748	1,711
R ²	0.005	0.056	0.001	0.056
Adjusted R ²	0.004	0.048	-0.001	0.048
Residual Std. Error	0.499 (df = 1744)	0.488 (df = 1695)	0.458 (df = 1744)	0.447 (df = 1695)
F Statistic	3.140** (df = 3; 1744)	6.719*** (df = 15; 1695)	0.445 (df = 3; 1744)	6.718*** (df = 15; 1695)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

References

Blei, David M. 2012. “Probabilistic topic models.” *Communications of the ACM* 55(4):77–84.

Blei, David M, Andrew Y Ng and Michael I Jordan. 2003. “Latent dirichlet allocation.” *The Journal of Machine Learning Research* 3:993–1022.

Roberts, Margaret E, Brandon M Stewart, Dustin Tingley, Christopher Lucas, Jetson Leder-Luis, Shana Kushner Gadarian, Bethany Albertson and David G Rand. 2014. “Structural Topic Models for Open-Ended Survey Responses.” *American Journal of Political Science* 58(4):1064–1082.